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Strategic Arms limitation Talks ll
minister from July 20 ro D ecember 31, Smisky simultaneously became the last prime minister of the Czech and
Slovak Federated Republic. Fo llowing the division of the
country on January 1, 1993, Klaus became prime minister
of cl1eCzech Republic. From 1993 ro 1995 Swiskywas
minister of transporratio n. In 1995 he became minister
of health. In February 1997, in an effort ro stave off the
bankruptcy of rwo prime reaching medical facilities ,
Smisky imroduced controversial cost-curring and consolidating measures.
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Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I
The Suategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) resulted
in a treaty limiring antiballistic missile (ABM) sysrems
and an agreement limiting srraregic offensive arms. These
accords were signed on May 26, 1972, afrer rwo and a
half years of negoriation berween the United Stares and
me USSR. A number of "agreed statements" chat clarified
specific provisions or pares of the negoriati ng hisrory were
attached.
The ABM Treary soughr ro preclude the developmenr
of narional missile defense systems. This rreary is of unlimired durarion bur allows either parry the righr ro wirhdraw on six-mo nths notice if ir believes irs narional inreresrs are jeopardized.
Two ABM deployment areas were allowed for each narion and were so resrrictive ch at a nationwide ballistic missile defense system could nor be developed. Each side was
allowed a system to defend its capiral and another ro prorecr an inrercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch
sire. These systems must be at least 1,300 kilometers away
from each ocher, and each could have one hundred inrercepror missil es and one hundred launchers. New generarions of early-warning radars may be deployed, but they
musr be sited along the periphery of each counrry and
directed ourward so as nor ro facilitate an ABM defense.
As agreed, the ABM Treary is reviewed every five years.
A protocol to this rreary was signed on July 3, 1974,
reducing the number of ABM deployment areas ro one
for each nation . The ABM Treary was criticized by conservatives in the United States for terminating the Safeguard ABM system, which was ro be deployed in rwelve
I .
~canons throughout the United States ro protect ICBM
Sites, and for erasing the U.S. lead in ABM research and
development. It was further criticized for encouraging the
Soviet Union to create a counterforce capability that
threatened U .S. land-based deterrent forces.
The agreement was to remain in force for five years,
and was a stopgap measure to limit the offensive strategic
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arms race while further negotiarions would be ca rried our
under SALT II. Under this ag reement, strategic land based ballisric missile launcher , includina d1o e und . r
b
construction were frozen at current level . Further,
submarine-laun ched ballistic miss ile ( LBMs) ould be
increased ro grea ter levels on ly if acco mpani ed by the destruction of an equal number of o ld er I BM o r LBM
launchers. Sovi et strategic force ceiling levels wer set at
1,618 ICBMs and 950 LBM (740 th n existed). U . .
strategic force cei ling levels were set at 1,054 1 BMs and
710 SLBMs (656 chen exi ted).
Ald10ugh mobile IC BMs, mu.ltiple- indepcndend ytargetable-reentry-vehicle (MIRV) ballisri missiles, and
srrategic bomber , of which th e United State enjoy d an
advanrage, were not covered in the lnrerim Agr ement, it
was criticized for conceding ro the USSR an advantage in
strategic bal listic missile launchers in return for th e co nrinuance of Easr-West arms control nego tiations.
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Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II
Second stage of strategic arms limitation talks (SALT II)
berween the USSR and the Un ited rates. T he primary
focus of these talks was the replacement of d1 e SALT I
Interim Agreemenr of May 26, 1972, wirh a more complete and balanced treary.
These calks resulted in the signing on Jun e 18, 1979,
of a Treacy, Protocol , and Joint Statement of Principles
rhar were never rarified by rhe U.S . Senate. Following the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that year, President Jimm y
Carrer withdrew the rreary from Senate consideration,
where ir had come under considerable opposition. The
Reagan adm inistration, in turn , never res ubmitted the
rreary because of Soviet violations, such as the Krasno-

